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A SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR PRIVACY/AGAINST SURVEILLANCE?  
SOME DIFFICULTIES IN ENGENDERING MASS RESISTANCE IN A LAND OF 
TWITTER AND TWEETS 
Laura Huey* 
Despite increased awareness of both privacy and surveillance issues and 
the forms of resistance frequently generated, little attention has been paid to 
the failure of issue advocates to spawn a larger pro-privacy/anti-
surveillance movement in North America. In this paper, I examine three 
inter-related factors that I see as potentially inhibiting the generation of a 
pro-privacy/anti-surveillance social movement in North America. Drawing 
on social movements theory, I suggest that those seeking to develop such a 
social movement need to: (1) demonstrate to a wider audience that a prob-
lem exists that requires individual and collective action; (2) carefully con-
sider how to frame the problem and, thus, the nature of the movement; and 
(3) set careful boundaries to delimit the nature and scope of the problem.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has become somewhat commonplace to say that the volume and 
configuration of surveillance within modern societies has increased signifi-
cantly over the past few decades. What has been less well discussed, within 
both popular and academic discourse, is the extent to which such practices 
generate resistance. From public debates over national identity cards to 
technologies and programs that profile suspected terrorists to community 
stakeholder battles over the use of CCTV in public spaces, surveillance-
based practices and regimes are clearly contested political territory. A quick 
scan of such activities in North America reveals an interesting fact that says 
much about the extent to which surveillance has become a significant politi-
cal issue to wider segments of the population. Simply put, while certain 
surveillance activities can and do generate local, national, or international 
resistance, as a whole the issue of surveillance has yet to spawn a larger 
social movement.  
Within this paper, I identify three inter-related factors that I see as 
potentially inhibiting the generation of a pro-privacy/anti-surveillance social 
movement in North America. Drawing on social movements theory, I sug-
gest that those seeking to develop such a social movement need to first suc-
cessfully grapple with the following issues: (1) it must be demonstrated that 
  
 *   Laura Huey is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Western Ontario. 
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a problem exists and that taking action will prevent a harm to both the indi-
vidual and the collective well-being of the general public; (2) advocates 
must carefully frame the problem and, thus, the nature of the movement; 
and (3) the scope of the problem must be clearly set in order to avoid the 
issue appearing too large or too amorphous and, thus, intractable. In the 
pages that follow, I examine these concerns, concluding with some final 
remarks on the likelihood of such a social movement arising.  
II. RESISTANCE TO SURVEILLANCE 
It might be helpful to begin with a definition of “social movement.” 
For this purpose, I am borrowing from Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, who 
state that “[a] social movement is a collective, organized, sustained, and 
noninstitutional challenge to authorities, power holders, or cultural beliefs 
and practices.”1 Such movements are defined by a collective sense of identi-
ty, ideology, and a shared grievance. “Collective efficacy comes when dis-
enchanted individuals, first, recognize themselves as a group with a shared 
grievance and, second, believe that collective action can reduce or eradicate 
the source of grievance.”2 Throughout history, shared grievances have 
spawned a number of collective efforts to alter harmful social, political, 
economic, environmental, health, and other conditions with varying degrees 
of success.  
Since the 1980s the issue of surveillance and the potential for ero-
sion of citizens’ rights to privacy have come increasingly to the fore in pub-
lic consciousness. As technologies with surveillance capacities proliferate, 
so too have fears about their usage and meanings, leading citizens to engage 
in a number of forms of resistance. Automobile drivers evade anti-speeding 
cameras and/or advise other drivers as to the existence of speed traps, indi-
viduals routinely opt-out of retail programs that track their purchases, and 
others utilize encryption software and other tools in efforts to retain online 
privacy. Professionally organized advocacy groups, as well as local gras-
sroots collectives, have also sprung up, either to defeat a particular surveil-
lance proposal or to engender sustained resistance to surveillance schemes 
in general. Yet, in spite of such efforts, and despite growing concerns over 
the proliferation of surveillance forms in North America, none of the actions 
of individuals or collectives have led, to date, to the formation of a genuine 
social movement. Rather, what we tend to see are discrete battles over par-
ticular programs or technologies that fail to translate into a wider push on 
the issue of surveillance and/or privacy.  
  
 1   SOCIAL MOVEMENT READER: CASES AND CONCEPTS 3 (Jeff Goodwin & James M. Jasper 
eds., 2003). 
 2   KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 
32 (2006). 
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I am hardly alone in my assessment of the state of what can only be 
termed, at present, the anti-surveillance/pro-privacy non-movement. In a 
recent book on the politics of surveillance and visibility, Kevin Haggerty 
and Richard Ericson make no reference to a wider social movement in this 
field; rather, in surveying the landscape, they find surveillance to be a polit-
ical battlefield on which individual stakeholder groups⎯both pro and 
con⎯attempt to influence particular configurations of surveillance.3 In rela-
tion to those stakeholders on the anti-surveillance/pro-privacy side of the 
equation, Colin Bennett makes the point more explicitly, stating, “[t]he pri-
vacy advocacy network has never been regarded as a ‘social movement’ 
either by those within it, or by those observing from the outside.”4 Similar-
ly, while David Lyon is of the view that privacy advocacy networks are 
“undoubtedly influential,” he suggests that they fail to “count as a fully 
fledged ‘social movement’.”5 Such views are echoed by Brian Martin, who 
also notes that “concern about invasions of privacy has not led to a mass 
movement against surveillance.”6  
To be clear, the views expressed by Haggerty, Ericson, Bennett, and 
Lyon in the previous paragraph are not universally held. In a recent study of 
resistance in the U.K. to the National Identity Scheme, Brian Martin, Rosa-
munde van Brakel, and Daniel Bernhard state that there is a “growing anti-
surveillance movement that is emerging in response to expanding surveil-
lance programmes [sic] in that country.”7 However, the only work I could 
find that suggests the existence of an anti-surveillance/pro-privacy move-
ment in North America is that of Andrew Clement and Christie Hurrell.8 In 
support of their contention that there is, indeed, a “privacy movement,” 
these authors point to the work of a number of national advocacy organiza-
tions that they see as effective in highlighting privacy and surveillance is-
  
 3   See generally THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY 7 (Kevin D. Hagger-
ty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2006). 
 4   COLIN J. BENNETT, THE PRIVACY ADVOCATES: RESISTING THE SPREAD OF SURVEILLANCE 
200 (2008). 
 5   DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 173 (2007).  
 6   BRIAN MARTIN, INFORMATION LIBERATION: CHALLENGING THE CORRUPTIONS OF 
INFORMATION POWER 57 (1998). 
 7   Aaron K. Martin et al., Understanding Resistance to Digital Surveillance: Towards  
a Multi-disciplinary, Multi-actor Framework, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 213 (2009),  
available at http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/ojs/index.php/journal/article/viewFile/ 
framework/framework (referring to a graffiti artist in London who has made a mural of resis-
tance including a soviet police officer and a dog looking for a resister).  
 8   Andrew Clement & Christie Hurrell, Information/Communications Rights as a New 
Environmentalism? (Canadian Research Alliance for Cmty. Innovation and Networking, 
Working Paper No. 3, 2005), available at http://www3.fis.utoronto.ca/iprp/cracin/publi- 
cations/pdfs/WorkingPapers/CRACIN%20Working%20Paper%20No%203.pdf. 
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sues within the media.9 In response to Clement and Hurrell’s characteriza-
tion of the network of privacy advocates as a “movement,” I find myself 
echoing Bennett: “To date, notwithstanding recent successful campaigns 
against specific practices, nobody would contend that the greater salience of 
the issue is attributable to the rise of a broader ‘pro-privacy’ or ‘antisurveil-
lance’ politics. It is still generally an elitist issue within government, busi-
ness, and civil society.”10 
Bennett’s point is easily supported by reference to the fact that we 
have yet to see any form of mass mobilization on the issue of privacy or 
surveillance generally. Indeed, Clement and Hurrell make a similar observa-
tion when they note “the great difficulty that the advocacy organizations 
have in mobilizing public support around anything other than dramatic pub-
lic ‘scandals.’”11 As of this time of writing, in the field of privacy/anti-
surveillance activism what we have is a network of privacy advocates that 
remains “somewhat fragmented with a relatively small, and geographically 
biased, core.”12  
How do we explain that, despite the work of privacy advocates and 
grassroots activists to raise public awareness of the threat to privacy that 
various forms of surveillance may represent, an anti-surveillance/pro-
privacy social movement has yet to materialize? Bennett offers two possible 
explanations. The first of these is that interest groups have yet to successful-
ly mobilize resources in a manner that would provide impetus to the devel-
opment of a wider movement.13 Social movements require resources to 
translate ideas into action. Such resources include money, volunteers, and 
cooperative relationships with other groups within the framework of a 
strong collective network.14 Bennett’s first explanation suggests the possi-
bility that a movement in this field might arise, but that it has yet to emerge 
because individual actors presently lack the means or the skills to acquire, 
pool, and employ the necessary resources.  
The second explanation Bennett proffers is the one with which this 
paper is more directly concerned. Bennett suggests the possibility that 
“there is something inherent in the issue, the properties of which can never 
elevate privacy and/or surveillance to a higher level of mass consciousness 
  
 9   Id. at 14 (noting specifically Privacy International and the Electronic Privacy Informa-
tion Centre (EPIC)). 
 10  BENNETT, supra note 4, at 207. 
 11  Clement & Hurrell, supra note 8, at 15. 
 12  Lucas D. Introna & Amy Gibbons, Networks and Resistance: Investigating Online 
Advocacy Networks as a Modality for Resisting State Surveillance, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 
233, 248 (2009), available at http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/ojs/index.php/journal/ 
issue/view/Resistance. 
 13  BENNETT, supra note 4, at 207. 
 14  GOSS, supra note 2, at 32 (citation omitted). 
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and political mobilization.”15 While I disagree with the use of the word 
“never” and, in fact, argue the opposite, I do share the view that there are a 
few problems in relation to the properties of the issue that inhibit the easy 
translation of individual privacy concerns into a broader-based movement.  
III. CREATING A SOCIAL MOVEMENT: THREE PROBLEMS 
In order to better understand why it is that the anti-surveillance/pro-
privacy issue has yet to fuel sustained collective action in North America, I 
turn my attention to another non-movement: gun control in the U.S. In her 
analysis of the failure of gun control advocates to spawn a wider movement 
in the U.S., Amy Goss concludes that a number of factors have inhibited the 
development of mass mobilization on gun control, including the inability of 
advocates to articulate a message that resonates with a wider audience.16 
Borrowing from James Q. Wilson’s 1995 study of public policy making, 
Goss argues that public policies and mass advocacy efforts in relation to 
opposing or supporting policies confer benefits and impose costs on indi-
viduals and groups.17 Thus, potential participants of collective action indivi-
dually weigh costs against the benefits of participation in collective action.18 
On the costs side of the ledger, participation may consume time and money 
as well as physical and/or psychological effort.19 On the other side are po-
tential psychological and practical benefits to be derived from participa-
tion.20 In some situations, the practical benefits are clear to participants, and 
they view the effort involved as minimal; however, in relation to certain 
forms of public goods, the benefits are not always evident or seen as realiz-
able, and the effort may seem too great in light of the potential rewards. 
Thus: 
[T]he central challenge to issue entrepreneurs who want to mobilize the 
public is to alter individuals’ cost-benefit calculation in a way that will in-
crease the odds of participation. To do so, issue entrepreneurs must turn 
the cost-benefit calculation on its head, by concentrating the benefits of 
participation at the individual or small-group level and distributing the 
costs to the broader society.21  
Goss elaborates on three means by which potential movement leaders can 
alter the cost-benefit ratio in order to increase citizen participation. First, 
  
 15  BENNETT, supra note 4, at 207. 
 16  See GOSS, supra note 2, at 50. 
 17  Id. (discussing JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1995)). 
 18  See GOSS, supra note 2, at 50. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id.  
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issue advocates can redistribute the costs of participating across either a 
wider group of individuals or across individuals and organizations with 
greater resources.22 Second, issue advocates can personalize the potential 
benefits to individuals and groups by framing the issue in such a way that 
citizens recognize the problem and feel both entitled and obligated to act.23 
The third method of engendering a recalculation entails convincing potential 
participants that their efforts will yield a positive outcome, what Goss terms 
“increasing the participation payoff.”24 To the extent that issue advocates 
successfully engage in these three activities, Goss explains, the greater the 
likelihood of engendering mass mobilization.  
In relation to examining the potential for a pro-privacy/anti-
surveillance movement, I want to focus more specifically on the second 
means—that is, the task of personalizing benefits for would-be participants. 
In essence, I intend to argue here that there are three inter-related issues that 
pro-privacy/anti-surveillance advocates face in relation to this task. First, 
there is the need to demonstrate to the wider public that there is indeed a 
problem that requires action. The existence of such a problem may appear 
crystal clear to advocates, but to the extent that privacy or anti-surveillance 
issues remain “elitist issue[s],”25 we can safely assume that their messages 
are not resonating in a world of Twitter and tweets. Second, there remains 
the issue of how the problem should be framed—is it a privacy issue or is it 
a surveillance issue? Is it both? And, of course, what are the benefits and 
disadvantages of choosing one frame over another? Third, advocates need to 
consider the possibility that without clearly delimited boundaries, the scope 
of the problem may appear as too large or the problem too amorphous, thus 
encouraging people to believe that their efforts will yield few positive  
results.  
A. It’s the End of the [Privacy] World as We Know It (and I Feel 
Fine)26  
In 2000, Reginald Whittaker published a book, the title of which 
contained a rather gloomy prophecy that caused many surveillance scholars 
and privacy advocates to howl in minor outrage. The book was The End of 
Privacy: How Total Surveillance Is Becoming a Reality, and the author’s 
central claim was that vast amounts of information about citizens are increa-
  
 22  See id. at 51. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id.  
 25  BENNETT, supra note 4, at 207. 
 26  REM, It’s the End of the World as We Know It (and I Feel Fine), on DOCUMENT (Capi-
tol Records 1987). 
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singly being amassed and used by corporate entities.27 The conclusion to be 
drawn from what is rightly suggested to be a staggering loss of personal 
privacy is, as evidenced by the title of the book, that the end of privacy is 
nigh. Some nine years later, with the proliferation of surveillance technolo-
gies and regimes continuing nearly unabated, and with more and more 
people voluntarily giving the world voyeuristic peeks into their interior 
lives, one wonders if maybe Whittaker may have undersold his thesis a  
little.  
I raise Whittaker’s book here, and the social and technological 
changes that have subsequently taken place in the few short years since it 
was published, to make a point: perhaps the largest issue privacy/anti-
surveillance advocates face today is demonstrating that privacy is something 
to be protected or, conversely, that surveillance is something from which to 
be protected—that is, that there is actually a social harm that requires reme-
dying. Part of the problem rests with the fact that privacy is a concept with 
variable meaning. Thus, whereas some airline passengers may take excep-
tion to being screened by airport security with the use of full body scanners, 
others may simply see such practices as an acceptable cost of flying. Simi-
larly, while it is the case that some of us may eschew the new technologies 
and social networking sites out of concerns for our privacy, the fantastical 
growth in usage of sites such as Twitter and Facebook—which not only 
permit but encourage up-to-the-second posting of one’s whereabouts and 
doings—suggests that we may well end up in the minority. More important-
ly, we have to ask how does one convince a growing number of people, who 
increasingly believe that “to be seen (as well as to see) can be ‘fun’,”28 that 
the practices they engage in are tied to something harmful that they ought to 
be fighting against? Or, in the case of airport scanners, how can people who 
see the scanners as a suitable method for expediting long lines at airport 
security be convinced that they are, in effect, giving up something important 
only to gain a few extra minutes at the airport duty-free? These are the types 
of questions with which potential leaders of a pro-privacy/anti-surveillance 
social movement must grapple. 
B. What Do You Call This Thing? 
In analyzing the roles that identity building and social relationships 
play in spawning and sustaining social movements, William Gamson con-
tends that “[a]ny movement that hopes to sustain commitment over a period 
of time must make the construction of a collective identity one of its most 
  
 27  See generally REGINALD WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: HOW TOTAL SURVEILLANCE 
IS BECOMING A REALITY (2000). 
 28  Hille Koskela, ‘The Other Side of Surveillance’: Webcams, Power and Agency, in 
THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE: THE PANOPTICON AND BEYOND 172 (David Lyon ed., 2006). 
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central tasks.”29 In relation to developing a pro-privacy/anti-surveillance 
movement, the matter of how to frame the core issue and, thus, the nature of 
the movement itself, remains an uncompleted project. In other words, 
should the central issue that drives a potential movement be anti-
surveillance, or ought the focus be instead on protecting or bolstering priva-
cy rights?  
There may be some confusion among advocates and scholars as to 
why I make a distinction between these two concepts. Certainly, anti-
surveillance and pro-privacy are frequently conflated; however, to use an 
analogy, we are really talking about two different sides of the same coin. I 
am not alone in making this point. In his own work on anti-surveillance, 
Brian Martin has cogently argued for drawing a careful distinction between 
privacy and anti-surveillance.30 For Martin, a social movement based on a 
“right to privacy” is problematic for several reasons, not the least of which 
is the fact that privacy is centered on a liberal notion of individual rights 
granted by the state. In contrast, surveillance is about power and unequal 
relationships within and across society; thus, surveillance moves us beyond 
the citizen-state relationship towards a politics that also encompasses the 
myriad of private relationships that structure our social lives. As Martin 
notes, “[a] focus on privacy directs attention to the individual whose privacy 
is invaded; a focus on surveillance directs attention to the exercise of power 
and to the groups that undertake it.”31 
Another consideration in relation to the question of how to frame 
the problem to be tackled is one that we have encountered previously: the 
fact that privacy is highly subjective. What the notion of privacy may entail 
for me can be vastly different from what it entails for others; thus, finding 
common agreement on the nature and scope of the problem, and how best to 
tackle it, could prove a near-impossible feat. In answer to this dilemma, 
Martin suggests that “people who have different concepts of privacy may 
agree to oppose particular types of surveillance.”32 I find his wording par-
ticularly instructive in relation to the point that I seek to make: “particular 
types of surveillance” suggests actions against clearly delimited regimes or 
technologies—what is, in effect, already happening under the patchwork 
quilt of anti-surveillance activities—which may prove to be insufficiently 
broad to support the founding of a social movement.  
Yet, if we stop for a minute to consider the matter, framing a social 
movement around the right to privacy also makes strategic sense. After all, 
  
 29  William A. Gamson, Commitment and Agency in Social Movements, 6 SOC. F. 27 
(1991). 
 30  See MARTIN, supra note 6. 
 31  Id. at 65. 
 32  Id. 
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there is, to the best of my knowledge, no state that has granted a positive or 
a negative right to “anti-surveillance,” and therefore anti-surveillance does 
not provide a ready hook upon which to construct legal, moral, and ethical 
challenges to programs or regimes. To the extent that there is a “right to 
privacy” enshrined in legislation, case law, and, perhaps more importantly, 
in the public psyche, we cannot dismiss entirely the potential utility of “pri-
vacy” in framing a social movement. In short, the question of what type of a 
movement should be created remains both an open and a difficult one.  
C.  Too Many Heads—The Hydra Complex 
The matter of how to frame the social harm to be tackled raises not 
only a concern in relation to setting the scope too narrow, but it also tosses 
up the equally legitimate concern that the scope may be set too wide, or the 
problem framed in such a way that it appears too amorphous to generate the 
belief that anything can be done at all. Again, participants join a movement 
because they believe that their actions—in a collective sense—will increase 
the likelihood of a positive outcome.33 In relation to both the concepts of 
privacy and surveillance and the issues each generates, what we frequently 
face is a hydra-headed complex of interlocking problems that can appear 
without end and/or simply too large to be successfully tackled. In other 
words, the focus of, for example, an anti-surveillance movement will neces-
sarily be on the “surveillance assemblage”—that is, the cumulative 
processes and effects of “multiple, unstable” regimes that lack “discernible 
boundaries or responsible governmental departments” crisscrossing, as they 
do, the public-private divide.34 As Haggerty and Ericson note,  
In the face of multiple connections across myriad technologies and prac-
tices, struggles against particular manifestations of surveillance, as impor-
tant as they might be, are akin to efforts to keep the ocean’s tide back with 
a broom—a frantic focus on a particular unpalatable technology or practice 
while the general tide of surveillance washes over us all.35 
Conceptually, privacy is of little help either. Its “diffuseness and 
multidimensionality” render privacy “one of those issues that is a mile wide 
and an inch thick,” thus it is not the type of public issue that easily lends 
itself to fostering “deep and abiding commitments”36 as, say, anti-smoking 
or animal rights do.  
  
 33  GOSS, supra note 2, at 32. 
 34  Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. 
605, 609 (2000). 
 35  Id. 
 36  BENNETT, supra note 4, at 213 (emphasis in original). 
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In short, issue advocates seeking to spawn a larger social movement 
in this field will have to grapple with the rather thorny question of how to 
set boundaries on the size and scope of the problem so as to avoid pessim-
ism and confusion over the possibilities of effecting change.  
IV. IS A PRO-PRIVACY/ANTI-SURVEILLANCE MOVEMENT POSSIBLE? SOME 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
In the preceding paragraphs I have sketched out some of the diffi-
culties that issue advocates face in attempting to generate a pro-privacy 
and/or anti-surveillance social movement. The successful resolution of each 
of these inter-related issues—(1) identifying the problem; (2) framing the 
overall nature (and thus the goal) of the movement; and (3) demarcating 
clear issue boundaries—is viewed as critical to the task of broadening social 
support. While it is the case that the challenges noted are rather complex, 
they are not insurmountable.  
For instance, in relation to the question of demonstrating that there 
is, indeed, a problem, issue advocates might build public awareness cam-
paigns based on a particularly egregious and well-known example of a vi-
olation of privacy, carefully drawing links between this example and other 
surveillance-based technologies or practices to show the broader implica-
tions of the issue. The goal of such an exercise, simply put, is to alter the 
cost-benefit ratio by revealing hidden costs associated with the use of a par-
ticular technology or set of technologies. An excellent illustration of how 
such challenges to the cost-benefits calculation can be achieved is found in 
the example of Facebook. When Facebook users became aware of the extent 
to which their personal information might be collected, stored, and shared 
on the site, a wave of resistance was generated that culminated in stricter 
site privacy controls.37 What issue advocates must capitalize on is the fact 
that when people are made aware of the potential for hidden or other costs 
that will negatively impact or outweigh assumed benefits, they are more 
likely to re-assess their behavior and/or views on an issue. 
The question of how to frame the movement is a tricky one. As 
noted, there are distinct advantages and disadvantages to being pro-privacy 
versus anti-surveillance and vice-versa. The pro-privacy movement relies on 
liberal notions of “rights” which mandate state-based remedies, whereas the 
anti-surveillance movement moves us beyond the state to the crux of power 
relations in both public and private spheres. Whereas Solomon was inclined 
to problem solve by cleaving a disputed object in half, I see some utility in 
combining both pro-privacy and anti-surveillance approaches⎯the sum of 
  
 37  Andrés Sanchez, Facebook Feeding Frenzy: Resistance-Through-Distance and Resis-
tance-Through-Persistence in the Societied Network, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 275, 286–7 
(2009). 
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two parts being greater. The latter problem-solving tactic allows for both 
state-based remedies, as well as taking us beyond the limits of that same 
state-based approach. The inherent problem with combining these issues is, 
I recognize, that we risk muddying the conceptual waters by making the 
problem too large or too murky; however, the converse is that we risk limit-
ing both the scope of the problem and the potential solutions so severely 
that any collective efforts will be hamstrung from the beginning.  
On its face, the hydra-headed problem also appears insurmountable. 
After all, how does one go about attempting to combat an enemy that seems 
to be here, there, everywhere, and nowhere at all? Still, social movements 
based on other amorphous notions of what constitutes a public good have 
been successfully generated in the past and present. The anti-globalization 
movement—based on another hydra-headed set of issues—represents an 
excellent case in point.38 Such successes suggest that, although laden with 
inherent difficulties in terms of constructing a suitable frame, spawning a 
successful pro-privacy/anti-surveillance movement is not an entirely im-
possible task.  
 
  
 38  See BENNETT, supra note 4, at 207. 
